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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial turmoil has placed the U.S. subprime mortgage industry in the 
spotlight. Over the last decade, this market has expanded rapidly and witnessed the entry of new 
major players, evolving from a small niche segment to a major portion of the U.S. mortgage 
market.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this trend was accompanied by a decline in credit standards and 
excessive risk taking by lenders (e.g., FitchRatings, 2007). Indeed, the rapid expansion of 
subprime lending is seen by many as a credit boom gone bad, as evidenced by increased 
delinquency rates of subprime mortgages and insolvency problems at major mortgage lenders. 
Yet, few attempts have been made to link empirically lending standards in the subprime 
mortgage market to its rapid expansion. How did lending standards change over the expansion? 
How did changes in local market structure affect lender behavior during the boom? To answer 
these questions, we use data from over 50 million individual mortgage applications combined 
with information on local and national economic variables.  
Our main finding is that the credit expansion in the subprime mortgage market led to a 
decrease in lending standards, as measured by a decline in application denial rates and a 
significant increase in loan-to-income ratios not explained by an improvement in the underlying 
economic fundamentals. Specifically, denial rates declined more and loan-to-income ratios rose 
more in areas where the number of loan applications rose faster. These areas subsequently 
experienced a sharper increase in delinquency rates (Figure 1), in a pattern reminiscent of boom-
bust cycles in emerging markets (e.g., Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco, 2006; Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy, 2006). Indeed, some have compared the current crisis in the U.S. mortgage 
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market to major financial crises in developed countries and emerging market economies that also 
experienced credit booms (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). 
We also find that changes in market structure affected lending standards. Denial rates 
declined more in areas with a larger number of competitors. Specifically, incumbents’ lending 
standards were negatively affected by the entry into local markets of new financial institutions. 
We interpret this as evidence that local lenders were “forced” to cut lending standards when 
facing competition from new entrants, which as it appears often enjoyed lower costs of funding. 
Recent work shows that house price appreciation (e.g., Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 
2007) and asset securitization (e.g., Keys et al., 2007; Mian and Sufi, 2007) helped fuel the 
subprime crisis.  Therefore we control for these factors in our analysis and show that, while 
increased recourse to securitization and the housing boom contributed to the decline in denial 
rates, our main results on the relationship between lending standards and credit expansion are 
robust to these additional controls.  
Our results are consistent with recent theories suggesting that strategic interaction among 
asymmetrically informed banks may lead banks to behave more aggressively and take on more 
risks during booms than in tranquil times (e.g., Ruckes, 2004, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006, 
and Gorton and He, 2008).
1 The subprime mortgage market provides an almost ideal ground for 
testing such theories because it is a less developed credit market with significant informational 
asymmetries. Subprime borrowers are generally riskier, more heterogeneous, can post less 
collateral, and have shorter or worse credit histories (if any) than their prime counterparts. At the 
same time, the wealth of information available and the geographical variation (Figure 2) in this 
                                                 
1 Our results are also consistent with, but not directly linked to, theoretical explanations for variations in credit 
standards focusing on the behavior of bank officers (Rajan, 1994, and Berger and Udell, 2004). 
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market allow us to control for several factors, such as changes in the pool of loan applicants, 
difficult to account for when analyzing aggregate credit growth. 
The evidence in this paper has important policy implications in that it highlights the 
dangers to financial stability stemming from credit booms. In particular, the paper highlights that 
there is a credit quality element in lending cycles.  It also sheds light on the origins of the current 
U.S. financial crisis by establishing a link between credit growth and lending standards in the 
subprime mortgage market, and by identifying changes in the structure of local credit markets as 
factors amplifying this decline in lending standards.  
We obtain our results using an empirical model where, in addition to taking into account 
changes in economic fundamentals, we control for changes in the distribution of applicant 
borrowers and for the potential endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Specifically, 
we develop a two-stage regression framework, explained in detail later on, that exploits 
individual loan application data to control for changes in the quality of the pool of loan 
applicants. We focus on loan applications rather than originations to reduce further the concern 
about simultaneity biases. For further robustness, we run an instrumental variable specification 
of our model, where we instrument the subprime applications variable with the number of 
applications in the prime market.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related literature. 
Section III provides a description of the data and introduces some stylized facts. Section IV 
describes our empirical methodology and central hypotheses. Section V presents the results. 
Section VI presents robustness tests of our main results. Section VII concludes. 
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II.   RELATED LITERATURE 
Several studies examine the interaction between economic fluctuations and changes in bank 
credit (Bernanke and Lown, 1991, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Peek and Rosengren, 2000, 
Calomiris and Mason, 2003,  and Matsuyama, 2007) and the link between financial development 
and economic volatility more generally (Raddatz, 2003, Kroszner et al., 2007, and Ranciere et 
al., 2008).
2 However, little evidence has been collected on how lending standards relate to credit 
booms. Asea and Blomberg (1998) find that loan collateralization increases during contractions 
and decreases during expansions, while Lown and Morgan (2003) show that lending standards 
are associated with innovations in credit. Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) find that during 
booms riskier borrowers obtain credit and collateral requirements decrease.  
A few papers have examined the recent boom from a house-price perspective, while not 
strictly focusing on the subprime market (Himmelberg et al., 2005, and Case and Shiller, 2003). 
The literature on subprime mortgages has instead largely focused on issues of credit access and 
discrimination and on what determines access to subprime versus prime lenders. Our loan level 
analysis builds on a model from Munnell et al. (1996) who show that race has played an 
important, although diminishing, role in the decision to grant a mortgage. A few papers examine 
how local risk factors affect the fraction of the market that uses subprime lending (Pennington-
Cross, 2002). Other studies focus on how borrowers choose a mortgage and on their decision to 
prepay or default on a loan (Campbell and Cocco, 2003, and Cutts and Van Order, 2005). 
A few recent papers focus on how securitization affects the supply of loans (Loutskina 
and Strahan, 2007) and mortgage delinquencies. Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2007) find that 
delinquency and foreclosure rates of subprime borrowers are to a large extent determined by high 
                                                 
2 See Levine (2005) for a review of this literature. 
       5
loan-to-value ratios. Mian and Sufi (2007) link the increase in delinquency rates to a 
disintermediation-driven increase in loan originations, while Keys et al. (2007) find that loans 
that are easier to securitize default more frequently. While we control for the effect of mortgage 
securitization, our focus is on the link between credit expansion and lending standards. 
 
III.   DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We combine data from several sources. Our main set of data consists of economic and 
demographic information on applications for mortgage loans. We use additional information on 
local and national economic environment and on home equity loan market conditions to 
construct our final data set. 
The individual loan application data come from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA) Loan Application Registry. Relative to other sources, including LoanPerformance and 
the Federal Reserve Bank’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey, this dataset has the important 
advantage of covering extensive time-series data on both the prime and subprime mortgage 
markets. The availability of data on the prime mortgage market provides us with a control group 
generally unavailable to studies focusing on aggregate credit or securitized pools of subprime 
loans. By comparing prime and subprime mortgage lenders we are also able to identify 
differences between the two lending markets. Given the different risk profiles of the prime and 
subprime markets, we include variables that proxy for the risk characteristics of a loan 
application to enhance comparability of the results across the two markets. 
Enacted by Congress in 1975, HMDA requires most mortgage lenders located in 
metropolitan areas to collect data about their housing-related lending activity and make the data 
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publicly available.
3 The HMDA data covers a broad set of depository and nondepository 
financial institutions. Whether an institution is covered depends on its size, the extent of its 
activity in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and the weight of residential mortgage lending 
in its portfolio.
4 Comparisons of the total amount of loan originations in the HMDA and industry 
sources indicate that around 90 percent of the mortgage lending activity is covered by the loan 
application registry (Table 1).  
Our coverage of HMDA data starts from 2000 and ends in 2006. This roughly 
corresponds to the picking up of both the housing boom and the rapid subprime mortgage market 
expansion (Figure 3). HMDA data does not include a field that identifies whether an individual 
loan application is a subprime loan application. In order to distinguish between the subprime and 
prime loans, we use the subprime lenders list as compiled by the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) each year. HUD has annually identified a list of lenders who 
specialize in either subprime or manufactured home lending since 1993. HUD uses a number of 
HMDA indicators, such as origination rates, share of refinance loans, and proportion of loans 
sold to government-sponsored housing enterprises, to identify potential subprime lenders. 
Since 2004, lenders are required to identify loans for manufactured housing and loans in 
which the annual percentage rate (APR) on the loan exceeds the rate on the Treasury security of 
                                                 
3 The purpose of the Act was two-fold: enhance enforcement of anti-discriminatory lending laws and disseminate 
information to guide investments in housing. 
4 Any depository institution with a home office or branch in an MSA must report HMDA data if it has made a home 
purchase loan on a one-to-four unit dwelling or has refinanced a home purchase loan and if it has assets above an 
annually adjusted threshold. Any nondepository institution with at least ten percent of its loan portfolio composed of 
home purchase loans must also report HMDA data if it has assets exceeding $10 million. Under these criteria, small 
lenders and lenders with offices only in non-metropolitan areas are exempt from HMDA data reporting 
requirements. Therefore, information for rural areas tend to be incomplete. Yet, U.S. Census figures show that about 
83 percent of the population lived in metropolitan areas over our sample period, and hence, the bulk of residential 
mortgage lending activity is likely to be reported under the HMDA. 
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comparable maturity by at least three (five, for second-lien loans) percentage points and report 
this information under HMDA. The rate spread can be used as an alternative indicator (to the 
HUD list) to classify subprime loans. For the years with available data, the ranking of subprime 
lenders using the rate spread variable alone coincides closely with the ranking in the HUD list.
5 
The HUD list of subprime lenders is also preferable to the rate spread information for a number 
of reasons. First, rate spreads are not available prior to 2004. Second, subprime loans do not 
necessarily have APRs that are three (or five) percentage points above a comparable Treasury 
rate but may reflect fees and yield spread premiums or other borrower characteristics determined 
by the lender. Third, and most importantly, the rate spread in HMDA is available only for 
originated loans, making it impossible to calculate denial rates for prime and subprime 
applications separately. 
We remove some observations with missing HMDA data from the sample and also focus 
on the subset of loans that are either approved or denied. First, we drop applications with loan 
amounts smaller than $1,000 because loan values are expressed in units of thousands of dollars 
and rounded up to the nearest number. Second, applicant income is left-censored at a value of 
$10,000. We therefore eliminate applicants with missing applicant income or applicant income 
of exactly $10,000. Third, we drop loans for multi-family purpose from the sample, as this is a 
distinct market from the overall mortgage market for single family homes. Fourth, we drop 
federally insured loans as their risk profile is likely to differ from that of other loans. Finally, and 
importantly, we eliminate all application records that did not end in one of the following three 
actions: (i) loan originated, (ii) application approved but loan not originated, or (iii) application 
denied. Other actions represent dubious statuses (e.g. application withdrawn by applicant) or 
                                                 
5 The correlation is around 0.8.  
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loans purchased by other financial institutions. Including purchased loans would amount to 
double-counting as these loans are reported both by the originating institution and the purchasing 
institution. 
We supplement the HMDA information with MSA-level data on economic and social 
indicators published by federal agencies, including annual data on macroeconomic variables, 
such as personal income, labor and capital remuneration, self-employment, and population from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), data on unemployment from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), data on total population from the Census Bureau, data on the number and 
income of domestic immigrants moving from one MSA to another from the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS), and data on house price appreciation in a given MSA (based on a quarterly 
housing price index) from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO). We 
also obtain data on “seriously delinquent” subprime loans, defined as subprime loans with 60 or 
more days delay in payment, from LoanPerformance, a private data company. Data on these 
delinquency rates are available only for 2004 onwards. 
Over the last decade, subprime mortgage lending has expanded rapidly both in terms of 
the number of loans originated and the average loan amount. Subprime mortgage originations 
almost tripled since 2000, reaching $600 billion in 2006. Against an also fast growing market for 
prime mortgages, this boom brought the share of subprime lending from 9 percent in 2000 to 20 
percent of all mortgage originations in 2006. Average loan amount also grew reaching $132,784 
in 2006 or 90 percent of the prime mortgage average amount. In absolute terms, the subprime 
market reached a size of about $1.3 trillion in 2006.  
A first look at our data suggests that rapid growth in subprime loan volume was 
associated with a decrease in denial rates on subprime loan applications and an increase in the 
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loan-to-income ratio on the loans originated by subprime lenders (Figure 4). These casual 
observations lend some support to the view that rapid credit growth episodes tend to be 
associated with a decline in lending standards. In the next sections, we explore these relations in 
a more formal setting. 
Table 2 presents the name and definitions of the variables we use and the data sources. 
Table 3 presents the sample period summary statistics of these variables at the loan application 
and MSA levels. The data cover a total of 387 MSAs for a period of 7 years (2000 to 2006), 
amounting to a total of 2,709 observations.
6 For the entrant and incumbent variables, summary 
statistics are based on data for the period 2001 onwards only, as entry data is missing for the first 
year of the sample period. The summary statistics show that about one in five loan applications is 
denied, while about one-fourth of all loans are extended by subprime lenders. As expected, the 
denial rate of subprime lenders is much higher (about 2.5 times) than the denial rate of prime 
lenders. 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
We rely on two main indicators of lending standards: the application denial rate and the loan to 
income ratio. We focus primarily on regressions at the MSA level. We control for changes in the 
economic environment in the MSA by including variables that have been shown to be good 
predictors of loan denial decisions at the individual level (see Munnell et al., 1996), such as 
average income, income growth, the unemployment rate, and the self-employment rate. We 
include a measure of house price appreciation to take into account the role of collateral. The 
                                                 
6 In 2003, the US Office of Management and Budget introduced a new classification of MSAs. We use the 2003 
classification of MSAs throughout the sample period to map individual loans to MSAs. Where necessary, the 
boundaries of the MSAs were changed to reflect this new definition. 
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number of competing lenders is a proxy for the competitive conditions in the MSA. Finally, we 
include the number of loan applications as a measure of credit expansion. We find this variable 
preferable to the number of loans originated or the growth in credit volume as it is arguably less 
endogenous to the dependent variable (i.e., denial rates). Endogeneity may remain a concern to 
the extent that potential borrowers might be deterred from applying for a loan if denial rates are 
generally high in their area. For this reason, we also estimate an instrumental variable 
specification of the model (details later on). In addition, we control for time-invariant MSA 
specific factors and for time-variant nationwide factors by including MSA and time fixed effects.  
We estimate the following linear regression model:  
DRit = αt +γi+ β1HPAPPit-1 +  β2AVGINCit +  β3INCGROWit +  β4UNEMPit +  β5SELFEMPit + 
  β6POPit+ β7COMPit + β8APPLit +εit,         ( E q .   1 )  
where DRit is the average denial rate of mortgage loan applications for home purchase and 
refinance purposes in MSA i in year t.
7 It is computed as the number of loan applications denied 
divided by the total number of all loan applications in a given MSA using loan-level data at 
individual banks, and hence, takes on values between 0 and 1.
8 All explanatory variables are also 
measured at the MSA level. AVGINC denotes average income, INCGROW is income growth, 
UNEMP is unemployment rate,  SELFEMP is self-employment rate, POP is the log of total 
population, COMP is the number of competing lending institutions, HPAPP is the annual change 
in house price appreciation, and APPL is the log of the number of loan applications. The error 
                                                 
7 Main results are unaltered when we exclude loans for refinance purposes. 
8 We estimate regression equation 1 using ordinary least squares as well as using truncated regression methods. The 
results remain the same. 
       11
term εit has the standard properties. MSA and time fixed effects control for time-constant 
regional idiosyncrasies and nationwide changes in economic conditions. 
  Our main variable of interest is the log of the number of loan applications (APPL), our 
proxy for credit expansion. Our working assumption is that if banks did not change their lending 
standards during the credit boom, the variable measuring credit expansion should not be 
statistically significant after controlling for the other factors affecting the banks’ decision to lend 
or not. If instead banks lent more leniently in regions and times of fast credit expansion, we 
should find a negative and significant coefficient for this variable. 
Theoretical work by Ruckes (2004) and Dell’ Ariccia and Marquez (2006) suggest that 
variations in the distribution of borrowers arising from changes in credit demand can affect the 
standards that banks apply in lending. The reason is that informational asymmetries both across 
banks and between banks and borrowers generate adverse selection problems that constitute the 
main incentives for banks to screen loan applicants. The link between credit expansion and 
lending standards depends on the impact of changes in the distribution of borrowers on the 
profitability for banks to screen out bad borrowers. In Ruckes (2004), lending standards change 
in response to variations in the quality of borrowers over the cycle. Prospects of businesses 
improve during the upswing of a business cycle, resulting in credit expansion and a reduction in 
lending standards. In Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), each bank has  private information about 
the creditworthiness of a different subset of borrowers. This generates an adverse selection 
problem when banks compete with each other. When the market expands and the proportion of  
new borrowers increases, the distribution of applicants each bank faces improves, and banks find 
it profitable not to screen out bad borrowers and  grant credit to all borrowers indiscriminately. 
While this equilibrium of reduced lending standards is efficient (i.e., maximizes aggregate 
       12
surplus for banks and borrowers), the reduction in screening results in a banking system with a 
deteriorated loan portfolio, enhancing the probability of financial instability with potentially 
negative welfare consequences. Reductions in lending standards are thus not necessarily 
beneficial for society as a whole. 
Our first control variable is house price appreciation. This variable is computed over the 
same period as the denial rates, although the results are not sensitive to using one-period lagged 
changes in house price appreciation. We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient. Price 
increases raise the net worth of borrowers, reducing their default risk. At the same time, lenders 
may gamble on a continued housing boom to evergreen potentially defaulting borrowers.  
The next five variables control for the general economic and demographic conditions in 
the MSA. We expect areas with higher per capita income and income growth to have lower 
denial rates; areas with higher unemployment rates and larger proportions of self-employed 
people, whose income tends to be more volatile, to have higher denial rates; and areas with larger 
populations, proxying for market size, to have lower denial rates. 
Finally, the number of competing lenders in the MSA (COMP) is meant to capture the 
effects of competition on lending standards. Since theory does not deliver unambiguous 
predictions of the number of competing lenders on lending standards
9, we do not have a strong 
prior on the sign of this coefficient. Theoretical models focusing on adverse selection (e.g., 
Broecker, 1990, and Riordan, 1993) predict that an increase in the number of competing lenders 
in a market may have the perverse effect of increasing lending interest rates and tighten banks’ 
lending standards. However, when local borrowers have an informational advantage, the threat 
                                                 
9 See Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) for a discussion of this issue.  
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of new entry may also induce incumbents to cut standards and trade loan quality for market 
shares.  
In an extension of our main specification, we test for these effects by focusing on the 
behavior of incumbent lenders when new lenders entered local markets. To that purpose we 
augment the model in equation (1) with a variable measuring the market share of new entrants. 
We compute the market share in terms of number of loan applications, not originations, to limit 
concerns about endogeneity. We expect the coefficient on the entrants variable to be negative 
since we already control for the adverse selection effect by including the number of competing 
lenders in the region. 
For robustness purposes, we construct an alternative denial rate-based measure of lending 
standards. We borrow and augment the empirical model presented in Munnell et al. (1996) to 
estimate bank’s loan approval decision with individual application data, though we do not have 
all variables they consider. Specifically, we do not have data on borrower credit scores. We 
augment their specification by including several new variables, including whether or not the loan 
is being used for refinancing purposes and whether or not the household income of the loan 
applicant is below the poverty line (as applicable in the year of loan application). We expect the 
latter to be particularly important in the case of subprime loans because applicants for subprime 
loans tend to have low income. We estimate the following logit specification at the loan 
application level for the year 2000: 
Djk = αk + γ1INCj +  γ2LIRj +  γ3POVj +  γ4REFINj +  γ5OCCj +  γ6Fj + γ 7Bj + γβ8Wj + εjk, 
            ( E q .   2 )  
where j denotes loan application j, k denotes lender k, αk denotes lender-specific fixed effects, 
and Djk is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if lender k denied loan application j in year 
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2000, and zero otherwise. All explanatory variables are measured at the loan application level. 
INC is applicant income, LIR is the loan-to-income ratio, POV is a dummy variable denoting 
whether or not the applicant income is below the poverty line for a family of four, REFIN is a 
dummy variable denoting whether or not the purpose of the loan is to refinance an existing loan, 
OCC is a dummy variable denoting whether or not the property financed by the loan is intended 
for owner occupancy, F is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the applicant is female, B 
is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the applicant is black, and W is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the applicant is white (the default option being of Hispanic origin).  
  Next, we use the estimated coefficients of equation (2) to forecast the denial rate for 
mortgage applications in subsequent years, and aggregate the residuals of this regression at the 
MSA level. Finally, we use this constructed measure of prediction errors as the dependent 
variable for our main model. The advantage of this two-stage regression approach over using 
simple, unadjusted denial rates is that it takes into account changes in the pool of applicant 
borrowers that are difficult to control for at the MSA level.  
As an alternative measure of lending standards, we consider the average loan-to-income 
ratio in the MSA. Other things equal, an increase in this ratio would signal a looser attitude in 
banks’ decisions to grant loans. We estimate the following regression model:  
LIRit = αt +γi+ β1HPAPPit-1 +  β2AVGINCit +  β3INCGROWit +  β4UNEMPit +  β5SELFEMPit + 
  β6POPit+ β7COMPit + β8APPLit +εit,         ( E q .   3 )  
where the set of explanatory variables is the same as in equation 1.  
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V.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
We find robust evidence that lending standards eased in the subprime mortgage industry during 
the fast expansion of the past few years. After controlling for economic fundamentals, lenders 
appear to have denied fewer loan applications and to have approved larger loans. Results for the 
denial rate regression, controlling for MSA fixed effects, are in Table 4. Column (1) reports 
results for all lenders, while columns (2) and (3) report results separately for either only prime 
lenders or subprime lenders (where subprime lenders are defined according to the annual list 
compiled by the HUD). This sample breakdown between prime and subprime lenders allows us 
to identify different characteristics of the two lending markets, including differences in the 
evolution of lending standards.  
Most coefficients have the expected sign. Starting from our main variable of interest, in 
the subprime mortgage market, the denial rate was negatively and significantly associated with 
the number of loan applications in the MSA. Given that we are including MSA fixed effects and 
thus effectively estimating regressions in first differences, this result suggests that the lending 
boom (as captured by changes in the number of applications) was associated with a reduction in 
lending standards (as captured by changes in denial rates). In the prime market, however, denial 
rates are positively and significantly associated with the number of applications, consistent with 
the notion that the lending standards in the prime market were tightened as applications grew. 
This suggests different credit boom dynamics in these two markets. In the subprime market, the 
decline in standards associated with the rise in the number of applications is consistent with 
theories of intermediation where asymmetric information among lenders plays an important role. 
In the prime market, the publicly available credit history of borrowers makes these frictions less 
likely to be relevant, and the tightening of standards in reaction to a growing number of 
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applications may reflect an expected deterioration in the quality of the pool of applicants. Indeed, 
the coefficient for the prime market loses significance when we control for changes in the 
characteristics of the applicant pool (see below).  
Turning to the other coefficients, in both markets a faster rate of house price appreciation 
was associated with lower denial rates. This reflects the positive effect of higher borrower net 
worth on creditworthiness but, as discussed before, may also be consistent with lenders gambling 
to some extent on speculative borrowers. Notably, this effect was much more pronounced in the 
subprime relative to the prime mortgage market where both these factors are likely to be more 
relevant. Denial rates in both markets are also lower in MSAs where applicants tend to have 
higher income. In the subprime mortgage market, denial rates were lower in more competitive 
markets as measured by the number of competitors in the MSA. This coefficient was, instead, 
not statistically significant for the prime market. The rest of the control variables have the 
expected sign, but are generally not significant. 
The greater effect of the credit boom, house appreciation, and bank lender competition on 
denial rates in the subprime market relative to its prime counterpart suggests that the decrease in 
lending standards was associated with different forces in these two markets. In the subprime 
market, the evidence is consistent with a decline in standards linked to lenders’ strategic 
interaction under asymmetric information and speculative behavior. In contrast, for the prime 
market, it is more difficult to reject the hypothesis of a fundamental-driven decline in lending 
standards. This is consistent with our prior that, relative to fundamentals, the deterioration in 
lending standards was more pronounced in the subprime mortgage market where the class of 
borrowers tends to be riskier than in the prime market. 
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A comparison of year effects across the different specifications shows that denial rates 
decreased until the end of 2003 and then increased from 2004 onwards, though only in the prime 
mortgage market. In the subprime mortgage market, after controlling for other factors, denial 
rates did not vary much over the period 2002 to 2006. Following several years of low interest 
rates, Federal Reserve started tightening monetary policy in mid-2004 by increasing interest 
rates. While denial rates in the prime mortgage market closely mimic the evolution of interest 
rates, with denial rates increasing sharply in 2005 compared to 2004, this is not the case for the 
subprime market, where denial rates do not increase in 2005 compared to 2004 (although they do 
increase somewhat in 2006). This suggests that, while in the prime market monetary policy 
changes reflected quickly in the denial rate likely through their effect on loan affordability,
10 this 
did not happen for subprime mortgages. Indeed, a regression specification replacing the year 
fixed effects with the Federal Fund rate returned a positive coefficient for the prime market, but 
not for the subprime market (not reported).
11  
The economic effect of our main findings is substantial. From regression (3) in Table 4, it 
follows that changes in the number of loan applications (a proxy for credit expansion) have a 
particularly strong effect on denial rates in the subprime market. For example, a one standard 
deviation increase in the log of the number of applications reduces MSA-level denial rates of 
subprime lenders by 4 percentage points, which is substantial compared to a standard deviation 
of subprime denial rates of 8 percentage points. The effect of applications on denial rates is 
                                                 
10 This is also consistent with the idea of a negative relationship between bank risk-taking and the monetary policy 
rate. This hypothesis is explored at length, though in a different context, in Jimenez et al. (2007).  
11 One explanation for this result relies on the fact that prime mortgages are mostly fixed-rate and are by definition 
underwritten for the fully-indexed cost while subprime mortgages are mostly adjustable-rate loans with low teaser 
rates. 
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significantly more negative in the subprime market than in the prime market. In fact, the effect is 
positive and significant in the prime market. A one standard deviation increase in the number of 
competitors reduces MSA-level subprime denial rates by 3 percentage points, slightly smaller 
than the effect of applications though still substantial. For the prime market, we obtain no 
significant relationship between denial rates and the number of competitors. Finally, a 
comparison of coefficients across regressions (2) and (3) shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in house price appreciation reduces MSA-level denial rates by 2 percentage points in the 
subprime market compared to only 1 percentage point in the prime market (compared to a 
standard deviation of denial rates of about 7 percent in both markets). 
 
VI.   ROBUSTNESS 
A.   Changes in the Pool of Applicant Borrowers 
Changes in the pool of applicant borrowers not captured by aggregate controls could partly 
explain our findings on the association between the number of applications and denial rates. The 
results, however, are broadly the same when, following the two-step approach described above, 
we control for changes in the underlying borrower population using data on individual borrower 
characteristics.  
To this end, we first identify in Table 5 (Panel A) which characteristics are likely to 
explain the decision on a loan application. We follow earlier studies on mortgage lending to form 
a list of variables that would account for the economic factors that might shape the financial 
institution’s decision.
12 These regressions are based on a sample of close to 5 million loan 
applications in 2000, and include lender-specific fixed effects. The regression coefficients 
                                                 
12 See Munnell et al. (1996) and references therein. 
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presented are odds ratios, hence a coefficient greater than one indicates that the application is 
more likely to be denied for higher values of the independent variable. 
We find that loan applications are more likely denied if borrowers have low income, 
though this effect is only significant in the prime mortgage market. Applications with higher 
loan-to-income ratios, denoting riskier loans, are more likely denied in the subprime mortgage 
market, as expected, though we find the opposite effect in the prime mortgage market. Taken 
together, these results indicate that applicant income affects lending decisions in a nonlinear 
fashion, and differently in prime and subprime markets. This is in part because applicants with 
higher incomes, who primarily apply for prime loans, also tend to apply for larger loans. Loan 
applications are also more likely denied for male applicants in the subprime market and for 
female applicants in the prime market, while applications of African-American descent are more 
likely denied in both markets (as compared to white applicants or applicants of Hispanic 
descent). White applicants also appear to be less likely denied a mortgage in the prime market. 
Finally, loan applications for refinancing purposes are more likely denied, while owner 
occupation does not significantly affect the loan denial decision.  
Next, we estimate the regression model with the MSA-level aggregated prediction errors 
from the model estimated in Panel A of Table 5 as the dependent variable. The results of these 
regressions (all of which include MSA fixed effects) are reported in Panel B of Table 5. These 
results, where we abstract from certain borrower characteristics that determine a lender’s 
decision on a loan application, are broadly consistent with the findings in Table 4. Again, we 
find that denial rates in both prime and subprime markets tend to deteriorate more in areas with a 
stronger acceleration in house price appreciation. Subprime denial rates also respond negatively 
to an increase in competition, as measured by an increase in the log of the number of 
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competitors, and to an increase in the number of loan applications, capturing the expansion of the 
credit market. A t-test of coefficient differences indicates that the coefficient for subprime 
lenders is statistically significantly different from the one for prime lenders. 
B.   Size Effects 
The relationship between lending standards and credit expansion appears to depend on the size of 
the market as well as the size of the boom itself. Table 6 shows that the coefficient of log number 
of applications is larger and more significant when our baseline specification is estimated on 
subsamples of MSAs with the number of applications above the median and the growth rate of 
applications above the median. Furthermore, the relationship is not significant in markets that 
experienced negative application growth (Table 6, column 3). 
Additionally, we confirm that the relationship between the growth in the number of 
applications and standards was stronger in relatively large markets in a specification interacting 
our growth variable with the log of the MSA population, using the log of MSA population as an 
alternative proxy for market size (not reported). While the linear coefficient for the growth 
variable is positive and significant, the overall relationship is negative for essentially all markets 
and becomes significant for markets above the 25th percentile of the population distribution. 
These results indicate that the link between credit expansion and lending standards is 
most pronounced in relatively large markets and in markets that experience rapid credit growth. 
C.   Effects of Entry and Changes in Market Structure 
As the subprime mortgage market expanded, its market structure changed and experienced entry 
by new players, including large financial institutions that had previously not been active in this 
market. We further refine our analysis by assessing the impact on denial rates of credit expansion 
by new entrants. 
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In Table 7 we report the results of our analysis of the effects of entry by new players on 
incumbent lending standards. Consistent with asymmetric information theories of competition in 
credit markets implying that an increase in the number of competing institutions increases 
adverse selection (Broecker, 1990, and Riordan, 1993), we find that an increase in the number of 
entrants (i.e., competing institutions) increases the denial rates of incumbent institutions in the 
overall mortgage market (column 1). In this regression, we use the market share of entrants, 
computed as the sum of each entrant’s share in total loan applications, rather than the simple 
number of entrants, to control for the size of each entrant and capture overall market power of 
entrants. 
The evolution of denial rates in the subprime mortgage market, in contrast, supports the 
notion of incumbents cutting their lending standards in reaction to the entry of new competitors 
(column 3). As the industry expanded and more subprime lenders entered specific metropolitan 
areas, denial rates by incumbent lenders went down. We take this as direct evidence of a 
reduction in lending standards in this market. We find a similar, though much less pronounced, 
effect in the prime market (column 2). The finding also supports the view that relatively smaller 
local lenders were “forced” to cut lending standards to remain competitive against national 
institutions that entered their markets with lower costs of funding. On average, entrants appear to 
have had a statistically significant advantage on this front. Total interest expense divided by total 
liabilities, a proxy for cost of funding, was 2.7 percent for entrants as opposed to 2.9 percent for 
incumbents (the difference being larger in MSAs that experienced larger growth rates in loan 
applications).
13  
                                                 
13 These calculations are based on a dataset that combines reports of condition and income (so-called Call Reports) 
from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago with the information provided in HMDA. 
       22
Denial rates of incumbent institutions are unlikely to affect the entry of new lenders to 
the extent that they reflect underlying applicant fundamentals. Thus, by focusing on the effect of 
new entrants on the denial rates of incumbent lenders we are able to assess the independent effect 
of market entry (and expansion) on incumbent lending standards. That said, high denial rates 
could conceivably attract entry if they reflect collusion among incumbent lenders rather than the 
underlying fundamentals in the MSA. However, a close-to-zero correlation between the 
incumbent denial rate level (lagged) and our entry variable suggests that this is unlikely to be the 
case. The evidence in this section suggests that, as for small business lending (see Petersen and 
Rajan, 2002), information technology may have reduced but has not eliminated the importance 
of geography in the mortgage market. 
D.   Identification Issues 
One should be careful in interpreting the estimated coefficients as causal relationships. As proxy 
for credit market expansion, the loan application series has arguably a smaller endogenous 
component than the loan origination series. That said, at least in theory, there remains some 
potential for reverse causality to the extent that potential borrowers may be deterred from 
applying for a loan if denial rates are generally high in their locale.  
While our focus on total applications (rather than applications in the subprime market 
only) partly assuages the potential for an endogeneity bias, for further robustness we estimate an 
instrumental variable (IV) specification of our model. In this particular specification, we use the 
log of applications in the subprime market as our main regressor, but we instrument it with a 
variable constructed using immigration data.
14 To be more specific, we use tax records from the 
                                                 
(continued) 
14 In another specification not reported here, we instrument the log of applications in the subprime market with the 
log of the number of prime applications. These two series are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is over 
0.8), while, at least in theory, there should not be a direct negative link between the denial rate in the subprime 
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IRS to determine the number of new residents in an MSA and the total income reported by these 
new residents. Then, we construct the instrumental variable as the log of the number of 
immigrants to the MSA divided by the average income level of the immigrants. The idea is that 
residents that are new to an area tend to be the ones applying for a mortgage loan yet their 
tendency to apply for a subprime loan is lower the richer they are. At the same time, it is very 
unlikely that immigrants’ choice of new residence depends on the lending standards in that area, 
implying that this should be a valid instrument for applications in the subprime market.  For 
comparison purposes, we also include the OLS regression of the specification that includes the 
number of applications in the subprime market.  
These OLS and IV results are presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. The IV 
estimates broadly confirm our earlier results, suggesting that our findings are not the product of 
an endogeneity bias. The F-test of excluded instruments supports the choice of our instrument. 
The evidence supports the notion of a negative causal link between an increase in the number of 
applications and denial rates in the subprime market.  
Similarly, house price changes may be affected by lending standards to the extent that a 
decline in standards and an increase in the local supply of mortgages leads to an increase in 
demand for housing. To address this concern, we consider a specification where we lag the house 
price variable one period. The results, presented in column (3) of Table 6, confirm our earlier 
findings that denial rates are negatively affected by (lagged) house price appreciation. 
                                                                                                                                                             
market and the number of applications in the prime market. If anything, this relationship should be positive, as 
higher denial rates in the subprime market would make the prime market more attractive. Indeed, the correlation 
between the denial rates in the subprime and prime markets in our sample is only about 0.1, suggesting that denial 
rates in both markets are largely independent from one another. This specification also delivers similar results. 
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However, some concern about endogeneity between denial rates and house price 
appreciation remains since it is conceivable that the expectation of a decline in standards, and 
hence, of an increase in the supply of mortgage liquidity, may trigger speculative pressures on 
the housing market. To address such concern we need an instrumental variable for house price 
appreciation. We obtain this instrumental variable from the work by Crowe (2008), who finds 
that in MSAs with a larger portion of the population belonging to Evangelical churches house 
prices tend to rise disproportionately faster when the “Rapture Index” rises.
15 This index maps 
current events into a subjective probability of an imminent coming of a time of “extreme and 
terrible” events and as such is independent from denial rates at the MSA level. We can then use 
the interaction term of the share of Evangelicals in the MSA population and change in the 
Rapture Index as an instrument for house price appreciation. The results of this exercise are 
reported in column (4) of Table 6 and confirm our original estimates. 
E.    Alternative Proxies for Credit Expansion and Lending Standards 
We now turn to alternative proxies for credit expansion and lending standards. First, we estimate 
our baseline model using the number of originated loans and the total loan volume as alternative 
measures of credit market expansion, obtaining similar results (Table 8, columns 5 and 6). 
Next, we turn regressions with the loan-to-income (LTI) ratio as dependent variable. As 
mentioned earlier, LTI ratios can be regarded as an alternative proxy for lending standards. We 
run separate regressions for average MSA-level LTI ratios in the prime market and the subprime 
market but only report results for the subprime market (Table 8, column 7). We find that higher 
average LTI ratios are associated with lower unemployment rates and are more common in high 
income areas and where there is a larger percentage of the population that is self employed. 
                                                 
15 The Rapture Index is available at http://www.raptureready.com/rap2.html 
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Turning to our variables of interest, the results indicate that LTI ratios grow with the number of 
loan applications, particularly in the subprime market, confirming the link between credit 
expansion and lending standards. The effect of competition is also confirmed with higher LTI 
ratios in MSAs with larger number of competing lenders. The house price appreciation variable 
enters only significantly in the subprime market regression, suggesting that LTI ratios in the 
prime market are not much affected by house price appreciation. In the subprime market, LTI 
ratios are strongly positively associated with house price appreciation. 
F.   Asset Securitization 
The increased ability of financial institutions to securitize mortgages over the past decade may 
have contributed to both the expansion of the mortgage market and the documented decline in 
denial rates. We want to make sure that our main results are not driven by asset securitization, 
which has been the focus of studies by Mian and Sufi (2007) and Keys et al. (2007). In Table 8, 
column 8, we explore how the increasing recourse to securitization of mortgages has affected 
denial rates in the subprime mortgage industry by augmenting our main specification with a 
variable measuring the percentage of loans in an MSA that are sold within a year from 
origination. For each originated loan in the HMDA database, the variable “Purchaser type” 
denotes whether the loan was kept on the books of the originating institution or sold through a 
private sale to another financial institution. We use this information to compute the share of 
loans sold within a year from origination and use this as a proxy for the ability to securitize loans 
in a given MSA. Given that the share of sold loans changes dramatically over the period, we 
allow this coefficient to be different for the 2000-2003 and the 2004-2006 periods.    
The results indicate that denial rates were lower in MSAs where a greater proportion of 
originated loans were sold within one year from origination, consistent with findings by Mian 
       26
and Sufi (2007) and Keys et al. (2007). This effect was more pronounced during the second part 
of the sample period, when securitization of subprime loans increased dramatically.  
 
VII.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper provides robust evidence that the recent rapid credit expansion in the subprime 
mortgage market was associated with easing credit standards. We link the change in lending 
standards to two main factors. First, we find evidence that standards declined more where the 
credit boom was larger. This lends support to the assertions that rapid credit growth episodes 
tend to breed lax lending behavior. Second, we find that competition played a role. Lending 
standards declined more in regions where a large number of previously absent institutions 
entered the market. We establish the latter result using variables that capture the effect of new 
entrants on the denial rates of incumbent lenders. This approach allows us to assess the 
independent effect of changes in local market structure on lending standards. 
  We further present evidence consistent with existing work that disintermediation played a 
role in altering the supply of credit, with denial rates declining more in regions where larger 
portions of the lenders’ loan portfolios where sold to third players. Finally, lower denial rates 
were associated with rapid house price appreciation, consistent with the notion that lenders 
relaxed credit conditions on the ground of expected gains in the value of housing collateral.  
  Our results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including controlling for 
economic fundamentals using out-of-sample data and using alternative measures of lending 
standards. The results are also robust to using instrumental variables to identify the independent 
effect of the number of applications and changes in house prices on loan denial rates. This 
mitigates concerns that our results are confounded by endogeneity between loan denial rates and 
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the volume of loan applications. Finally, the effects we identify for the subprime market are 
either much weaker or absent in the prime mortgage market, lending additional support that the 
deterioration in lending standards was more pronounced in the subprime mortgage market. Our 
evidence suggests that while in the prime market lending standards were largely determined by 
underlying fundamentals, for subprime loans lending market conditions and strategic interactions 
played an important role in lending decisions.  
From a policy perspective, our results are relevant for the ongoing debate on the 
procyclicality of bank regulation and its impact on bank risk-taking (e.g., Kashyap, Rajan, and 
Stein, 2008, and Adrian and Shin, 2008). To the extent that during booms standards decline more 
than justified by economic fundamentals, our findings are consistent with the view that bankers 
have “an unfortunate tendency” to lend too aggressively at the peak of a cycle.
16 That said, credit 
booms may still be beneficial. While, in light of the recent financial turmoil, it is easy to argue 
that standards were excessively lax, it is much harder to assess the benefits associated with 
greater access to credit, and hence, the net welfare effect of the subprime expansion. 
                                                 
16 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan in a speech delivered before the Independent Community 
Bankers of America on March 7, 2001. See also Bernanke (2007). 
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Year HMDA database Whole market Coverage (percent)
2000 0.922 1.184 77.84
2001 1.854 2.080 89.14
2002 2.558 2.878 88.88
2003 3.338 3.810 87.60
2004 2.569 2.771 92.73
2005 2.888 3.031 95.28
2006 2.616 2.731 95.78
Total volume of originations (trillions of dollars)
Table 1. Coverage in HMDA
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Name Short name Definition Source
Loan application level
Denied D Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan application is denied 
and 0 otherwise
HMDA
Subprime S Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the lender is in the HUD 
subprime lender list and 0 otherwise
HMDA
Loan amount AMT Principal amount of the loan or application (in thousands of dollars) HMDA
Applicant income INC Total gross annual income the lender relied upon in making the credit 
decision (in thousands of dollars)
HMDA
Loan-to-income ratio LIR Ratio of loan amount to applicant income HMDA
Poverty POV Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant income is below 
the poverty line for a famikly of four as published by the Department 
of Health and Human Services and 0 otherwise
HMDA
Refinancing REFIN Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the loan purpose is refinancing 
an existing loan and 0 otherwise (i.e., if the loan purpose is new home 
purchase)
HMDA
Owner-occupied OCC Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the property is intended for 
owner occupancy and 0 otherwise
HMDA
Female F Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is female and 0 
otherwise
HMDA
Black B Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is black and 0 
otherwise (i.e., if the applicant is white or hispanic)
HMDA
White W Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the applicant is white and 0 
otherwise (i.e., if the applicant is black or hispanic)
HMDA
MSA level
Denial rate DR Number of denied loan applications divided by the total number of 
applications
HMDA
House price appreciation HPAPP Change in the house price index OFHEO
Average income AVGINC Total MSA income divided by population BEA
Income growth INCGROW Change in total MSA income BEA
Unemployment rate UNEMP Number of unemployed as a percent of labor force BLS
Self employment rate SELFEMP Number of self-employed (those whose primary source of income is 
profits from their unincorporated businesses) divided by the number 
of employed
BEA
Log population POP Population in MSA (in log) Census Bureau
Log number of competitors COMP Number of institutions accepting applications and extending loans in 
the MSA
HMDA
Log number of applications APPL Number of loan applications in the MSA HMDA
Loan-to-income ratio LIR Average loan-to-income ratio on the loans originated in the MSA HMDA
Proportion of loans sold SEC Securitized loans as a percent of total originated loans HMDA
Subprime delinquency rate DEL Subprime mortgages with 60 or more days of payment delay LoanPerformance
Table 2. Definitions and Sources of Variables
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan application level
Denied 72,119,135 0.19 0.39 0 1
Subprime 72,119,135 0.23 0.42 0 1
Loan amount (in thousands of dollars) 72,119,135 160.59 125.41 1 1800
Applicant income (in thousands of dollars) 72,119,135 82.16 50.32 16 363
Loan-to-income ratio 72,119,135 2.17 1.28 1 6
Poverty 72,119,135 0.00 0.02 0 1
Refinancing 72,119,135 0.60 0.49 0 1
Owner-occupied 72,119,135 0.92 0.28 0 1
Female 72,119,135 0.29 0.45 0 1
Black 72,119,135 0.10 0.29 0 1
White 72,119,135 0.73 0.45 0 1
MSA level
Denial rate 2,709 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.55
Denial rate of prime lenders 2,709 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.52
Denial rate of subprime lenders 2,703 0.50 0.08 0.00 0.73
House price appreciation 2,651 0.07 0.06 -0.05 0.41
Average income (in thousands of dollars) 2,653 29.72 6.22 13.57 71.90
Income growth 2,653 0.05 0.03 -0.34 0.48
Unemployment rate (in %) 2,709 5.28 2.06 1.90 17.40
Self employment rate 2,653 0.17 0.03 0.07 0.31
Log population 2,653 12.77 1.23 10.87 16.75
Log number of competitors 2,709 5.42 0.50 1.95 6.62
Log number of applications 2,709 9.31 1.24 6.13 13.38
Loan-to-income ratio 2,709 1.88 0.37 1.05 3.40
Proportion of loans sold  2,709 0.46 0.10 0.00 0.78
Subprime delinquency rate (in %) 1,137 10.49 3.58 1.70 35.80
Denial rate of incumbents 2,316 0.25 0.07 0.07 0.52
Denial rate of prime lender incumbents 2,316 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.45
Denial rate of subprime lender incumbents 2,300 0.51 0.09 0.00 0.77
Denial rate of entrants 2,311 0.25 0.12 0.00 0.73
Denial rate of prime lender entrants 2,310 0.18 0.09 0.00 0.73
Denial rate of subprime lender entrants 2,299 0.47 0.17 0.00 1.00
Market share of entrants 2,316 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.98
Market share of prime lender entrants 2,316 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.99
Market share of subprime lender entrants 2,311 0.08 0.12 0.00 1.00
Table 3. Summary Statistics
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All lenders Prime lenders Subprime lenders
Dependent variable: Denial rate (1) (2) (3)
House price appreciation -0.234*** -0.150*** -0.308***
[0.014] [0.016] [0.025]
Average income -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.004**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Income growth 0.003 -0.021 0.1
[0.037] [0.031] [0.087]
Unemployment rate 0.003** 0.002 0.003*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Self employment rate 0.046 0.08 -0.311**
[0.075] [0.083] [0.130]
Log population -0.180*** -0.232*** -0.353***
[0.038] [0.037] [0.074]
Log number of competitors 0.018*** -0.003 -0.069***
[0.006] [0.008] [0.012]
Log number of applications -0.017*** 0.025*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Year = 2001 -0.052*** -0.086*** 0.116***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
Year = 2002 -0.075*** -0.112*** 0.067***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.008]
Year = 2003 -0.070*** -0.135*** 0.118***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.010]
Year = 2004 0.001 -0.085*** 0.099***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009]
Year = 2005 0.021*** -0.029*** 0.098***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.011]
Year = 2006 0.021*** -0.007 0.114***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.012]
Constant 2.697*** 3.065*** 5.749***
[0.470] [0.465] [0.913]
Observations 2651 2651 2646
Number of MSAs 379 379 379
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 6 90 . 7 10
Table 4. Evolution of Denial Rates
Notes: Dependent variable in regression (1) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of all mortgage lenders, 
weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Dependent variable in 
regression (2) is the weighted-average denial rate of prime mortgage lenders. Dependent variable in regression (3) is 
the weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders. For detailed definitions of the independent variables, 
see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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All lenders Prime lenders Subprime lenders
Dependent variable: Dummy = 1 if application is denied (1) (2) (3)
Applicant income 0.454*** 0.387*** 0.995
[0.051] [0.056] [0.058]
Loan-to-income ratio 0.922 0.813*** 1.236***
[0.051] [0.049] [0.068]
Poverty 1.057 1.206*** 0.948
[0.060] [0.070] [0.067]
Refinancing 1.573** 1.213 1.514**
[0.284] [0.213] [0.274]
Owner-occupied 1.089 1.074 0.986
[0.102] [0.124] [0.118]
Female 1.023 1.060*** 0.897**
[0.021] [0.018] [0.040]
Black 1.522*** 1.526*** 1.246***
[0.079] [0.085] [0.050]
White 0.704*** 0.674*** 0.953
[0.033] [0.037] [0.048]
Observations 5406178 4499811 906367
Number of lenders 7226 7041 185
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.02
All lenders Prime lenders Subprime lenders
Dependent variable: Prediction error (1) (2) (3)
House price appreciation -0.178*** -0.104*** -0.281***
[0.012] [0.013] [0.028]
Average income -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Income growth -0.015 0.007 -0.002
[0.029] [0.026] [0.077]
Unemployment rate -0.001 -0.004*** 0.003
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Self employment rate -0.120* -0.048 -0.414***
[0.062] [0.062] [0.140]
Log population -0.183*** -0.166*** -0.335***
[0.032] [0.030] [0.084]
Log number of competitors 0.021*** 0.008 -0.051***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.016]
Log number of applications -0.019*** -0.002 -0.026**
[0.004] [0.004] [0.010]
Constant 2.660*** 2.355*** 5.026***
[0.402] [0.379] [1.045]
Observations 2273 2273 2268
Number of MSAs 379 379 379
R-squared 0.90 0.87 0.42
Table 5. Changes in the Applicant Pool
Panel A. Determinants of Denial Decision
Panel B. Prediction Errors
Notes: Panel A displays the results of logit regressions using loan application-level data in 2000, where dependent variable is 1 if the loan application is 
denied and 0 if it is approved. The reported coefficients are odds ratios; hence, a coefficient greater than 1 indicates that the application is more likely to 
be denied for higher values of the independent variable. All regressions include lender fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard errors clustered by 
lender are in brackets.  In Panel B, the dependent variable, prediction error, is calculated as the MSA-level average of the actual denial rate minus the 
MSA-level average of the denial rate predicted based on the logit regressions in Panel A. In each year, the coefficients obtained on the 2000 data are 
used to predict the probability of denial for a loan application. The average of these predicted values is the predicted denial rate. For detailed definitions 
of the independent variables, see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported). Robust standard 









Only MSAs with the 
number of applications 
exceeding the median
Only MSAs with both 
the number of 
applications and the 
growth in number of 
applications exceeding 
the median
Only MSAs with 
negative growth in 
number of applications
Dependent variable: Denial rate ( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )(
House price appreciation -0.308*** -0.240*** -0.127* -0.303***
[0.025] [0.031] [0.073] [0.049]
Average income -0.004** -0.003 0.000 -0.001
[0.001] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Income growth 0.100 0.038 0.183* -0.065
[0.087] [0.124] [0.110] [0.111]
Unemployment rate 0.003* 0.006** 0.012*** 0.008**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Self employment rate -0.311** -0.109 0.051 -0.332*
[0.130] [0.162] [0.452] [0.178]
Log population -0.353*** -0.170 -0.233* -0.257**
[0.074] [0.104] [0.131] [0.119]
Log number of competitors -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.178*** -0.082***
[0.012] [0.018] [0.033] [0.027]
Log number of applications -0.030*** -0.067*** -0.061*** -0.017
[0.008] [0.012] [0.019] [0.019]
Year = 2001 0.116*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.039***
[0.006] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013]
Year = 2002 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.061*** -0.005
[0.008] [0.013] [0.018] [0.013]
Year = 2003 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.126*** 0
[0.010] [0.016] [0.024] [0.000]
Year = 2004 0.099*** 0.083*** 0.000 0.000
[0.009] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000]
Year = 2005 0.098*** 0.083*** 0.094*** 0.008
[0.011] [0.017] [0.030] [0.011]
Year = 2006 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.159*** 0.025*
[0.012] [0.018] [0.040] [0.014]
Constant 5.749*** 3.898*** 5.158*** 4.430***
[0.913] [1.346] [1.795] [1.430]
Observations 2646 1358 765 987
Number of MSAs 379 242 242 379
R - s q u a r e d 0 . 4 40 . 5 30 . 6 30
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders, weighted by the 
size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Regression (1) is the same as the one in Table 4, column 3, 
reproduced here for easy comparison. Regression (2) uses only the observations where the number of applications in the MSA exceed the 
sample median of 11,000. Regression (3) uses only the observations where both the number of applications and the growth in number of 
applications exceed the sample medians (11,000 and 13 percent for MSAs with number of applications above median, respectively). For 
detailed definitions of the independent variables, see Table 2. All regressions are OLS and include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and 
year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
Subprime lenders
Table 6. Market and Boom Size
4 )
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All entrants Prime entrants Subprime entrants
(1) (2) (3)
House price appreciation -0.205*** -0.096*** -0.297***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.027]
Average income -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Income growth 0.009 0.041 0.031
[0.042] [0.036] [0.094]
Unemployment rate 0.001 -0.001 0.006**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Self employment rate -0.087 -0.074 -0.291**
[0.074] [0.070] [0.136]
Log population -0.164*** -0.224*** -0.348***
[0.042] [0.038] [0.093]
Log number of competitors 0.006 0.011** -0.063***
[0.006] [0.004] [0.014]
Log number of applications -0.052*** -0.031*** -0.022**
[0.005] [0.004] [0.010]
Market share of entrants 0.024
[0.028]
Market share of entrants into prime market -0.023*
[0.014]
Market share of entrants into subprime market -0.149***
[0.032]
Year=2001 -0.104*** -0.104*** 0.033***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.012]
Year=2002 -0.110*** -0.120*** -0.026***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.009]
Year=2003 -0.085*** -0.117*** 0.022**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.010]
Year=2004 -0.021*** -0.082*** 0.001
[0.003] [0.004] [0.007]




Constant 2.990*** 3.568*** 5.572***
[0.527] [0.476] [1.153]
Observations 2273 2273 2263
Number of MSAs 379 379 379
R-squared 0.76 0.74 0.34
Table 7. Market Entry and Denial Rates of Incumbents in Prime and Subprime Markets
0
 
Notes: Dependent variable in regression (1) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of incumbent mortgage lenders, weighted by the 
size of each institution in terms of number of loan applications received. Dependent variable in regression (2) is the weighted-average denial 
rate of incumbent prime mortgage lenders. Dependent variable in regression (3) is the weighted-average denial rate of incumbent subprime 
mortgage lenders. Incumbent institutions are those that were active in the MSA at the start of the year. Entrants are those that entered the 
MSA during a given year. We consider each year that an institution entered the MSA an actual entry, even if the institution had entered and 
then exited the MSA. Market share of entrants is the market share in loan applications received by entrants. Market share of entrants into 
prime market is loan applications received by entering prime mortgage lenders as a fraction of loan applications received by all subprime 
mortgage lenders. Market share of entrants into subprime market is loan applications received by entering subprime mortgage lenders as a 
fraction of loan applications received by all subprime mortgage lenders. All regressions include MSA fixed effects (not reported) and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in brackets. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%. 
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Lagged house price 
appreciation
IV: Evangelicals and 
Rapture index Originations






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
House price appreciation -0.329*** -0.348*** -0.576*** -0.278*** -0.272*** 0.222*** -0.269***
[0.025] [0.035] [0.167] [0.026] [0.025] [0.079] [0.026]
House price appreciation, lagged -0.226*** 0.029*** -0.002
[0.042] [0.004] [0.001]
Average income -0.004** 0.001 0.002 -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002 -0.924*** 0.096
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.145] [0.083]
Income growth 0.108 -0.111 -0.103 0.189*** 0.092** 0.068 -0.009* 0.004*
[0.090] [0.090] [0.086] [0.071] [0.045] [0.045] [0.005] [0.002]
Unemployment rate 0.003* 0.001 0.005** 0 0.003 0.002 1.578*** -0.271**
[0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.383] [0.130]
Self employment rate -0.271** -0.240 -0.167 -0.289** -0.332*** -0.310*** -0.176 -0.256***
[0.131] [0.170] [0.133] [0.124] [0.120] [0.120] [0.168] [0.078]
Log population -0.385*** 0.068 -0.313*** -0.304*** -0.300*** -0.272*** 0.277*** -0.057***
[0.073] [0.148] [0.089] [0.073] [0.050] [0.050] [0.034] [0.012]
Log number of competitors -0.074*** 0.077 -0.055*** -0.057*** -0.067*** -0.053*** 0.265*** -0.032***
[0.013] [0.046] [0.013] [0.017] [0.012] [0.012] [0.021] [0.009]
Log number of all originations -0.046***
[0.007]
Log of originated loans by all lenders -0.050***
[0.006]
Log number of all applications -0.033***
[0.010]
Log number of subprime applications -0.013** -0.248*** -0.014***
[0.006] [0.069] [0.005]
Proportion of loans sold -0.123***
[0.030]
Proportion of loans sold * Year >= 2004 -0.110***
[0.026]
Constant 5.996*** 0.955 5.094*** 4.918*** 5.181*** 4.975*** -0.801 4.444***
[0.910] [1.696] [1.132] [0.953] [0.616] [0.613] [2.089] [0.972]
F-test of excluded instruments (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000***
Observations 2646 2646 2267 2646 2646 2646 2646 2646
Number of MSAs 379 379 379 379 379 379 379 379
R-squared 0.43 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.45 0.60 0.45
Table 8. Robustness Tests
 
Notes: Dependent variable in all regressions except in (7) is the MSA-level weighted-average denial rate of subprime mortgage lenders, weighted by the size of each institution in terms of number of 
loan applications received. Dependent variable in regression (7) is the average loan-to-income ratio of loans originated by subprime mortgage lenders. In regression (1), log number of applications is 
replaced with the log number of subprime applications. In regression (2), log number of domestic immigrants scaled by their average income is used as an instrument for log number of subprime 
applications. In regression (3), house price appreciation is replaced with its lagged value. In regression (4), the interaction of the proportion of evangelicals in the MSA and the rapture index is used as an 
instrument for house price appreciation. In regressions (5) and (6), log number of originations and log volume of originated loans, respectively, are used instead of log number of applications. In 
regression (8), proportion of loans sold, the securitization measure, is the ratio of the number of loans sold within a year of origination to the total number of loans approved in the MSA. A variable 
constructed as the interaction of proportion of loans sold and a dummy variable that is 1 for years 2004, 2005, and 2006 is also included. For detailed variable definitions, see Table 2. Regressions (1), 
(3), (5), (6), (7), and (8) are estimated using OLS and regressions (2) and (4) are estimated using instrumental variables. All regressions include MSA fixed effects and year fixed effects (not reported). 
Robust standard errors are in brackets. We also report the p-value of the F-test of excluded instruments. * denotes significance at 10%; ** significance at 5%; *** significance at 1%.
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Note: Data available for MSAs only.
       41





















Total volume of mortgage loan 
originations (billions of dollars, 
right-hand  scale)
House price index (left-hand scale)
 
 













-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6






























-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Change in loan-to-income ratio
C
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
l
o
a
n
 
v
o
l
u
m
e